| 考虑随机扰动的碳标签产品供应链多主体博弈与协同机制研究 |
| Multi-agent Game and Coordination Mechanism in Carbon-Labeled Product Supply Chains under Random Disturbances |
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| 中文关键词:碳标签产品 绿色供应链 绿色采购 政府监管 随机演化博弈 |
| 英文关键词:carbon-labeled products green supply chain green procurement government intervention stochastic evolutionary game |
| 基金项目:国家社会科学基金项目（24CGL049）。 |
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| 中文摘要: |
| 碳标签制度的推行有助于引导企业减排并促进供应链绿色转型。然而，碳标签产品供应链涉及主体众多、链条复杂，且受市场波动、政策扰动及信息不对称等不确定因素影响，供应商、核心企业与政府在制定绿色策略时易出现激励错配与协同失衡。针对这一问题，本文构建了包含供应商、核心企业与政府三方的随机演化博弈模型，分析随机扰动条件下多主体绿色策略的动态演化规律，并探讨初始策略、利润分配、内部核查及政府干预对供应链协同机制的作用。结果表明：供应商初始配合意愿是推动核心企业绿色采购和政府积极监管策略演进的关键，强扰动条件下主体间协同不足会加剧策略波动；核心企业通过合理利润分配与适度核查可稳定供应链策略演化；政府补贴与外部惩罚虽能激励绿色行为，但在不确定条件下呈现非对称效应，可能引发策略波动与决策不稳定。研究结论为构建激励相容、稳定高效的碳标签产品供应链协同机制提供了理论支撑与政策启示。 |
| 英文摘要: |
| The implementation of carbon labeling systems facilitates corporate emission reduction and promotes the green transformation of supply chains. Carbon-labeled product supply chains, however, involve multiple stakeholders and complex interactions, and are subject to uncertainties such as market fluctuations, policy disturbances, and information asymmetry, which may lead to misaligned incentives and weakened coordination among suppliers, core enterprises, and government agencies. To address these challenges, this study develops a three-party stochastic evolutionary game model to examine the dynamic evolution of green strategies under random disturbances. The model also investigates the effects of initial strategies, profit allocation, internal audits, and government interventions on supply chain coordination. Results show that suppliers’ initial willingness to cooperate is critical for driving the evolution of core enterprises’ green procurement and government proactive regulation, while insuffi cient coordination under strong disturbances amplifi es strategy fl uctuations. Core enterprises can stabilize strategy evolution through appropriate profi t allocation and moderate auditing. Government subsidies and external penalties, although eff ective in promoting green behavior, exhibit asymmetric eff ects under uncertainty, potentially inducing strategy fl uctuations and decision instability. Findings may provide theoretical support and practical insights for designing incentive-compatible and resilient coordination mechanisms in carbon-labeled product supply chains. |
| 姜琰,杨杉.考虑随机扰动的碳标签产品供应链多主体博弈与协同机制研究[J].科学决策,2025,(11):174~187 |
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